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PERSPECTIVES
The best strategy for combating SQL injection, which has emerged as the 
most widespread website security risk, calls for integrating defensive 
coding practices with both vulnerability detection and runtime attack  
prevention methods.
S tructured Query Language injection is a code injec-tion technique commonly used to attack websites in which the attacker inserts SQL characters or key-words into a SQL statement via unrestricted user 
input parameters to change the intended query’s logic.1 This 
threat exists in any Web application that accesses a data-
base via SQL statements constructed with external input 
data. By manipulating this data to modify the statements, 
an attacker can cause the application to issue arbitrary SQL 
commands and thereby compromise the database. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
ranks SQL injection as the most widespread website secu-
rity risk (www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10). In 2011, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National 
Vulnerability Database (nvd.nist.gov) reported 289 SQL 
injection vulnerabilities (7 percent of all vulnerabilities) in 
websites, including those of IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, 
WordPress, and Joomla. In December 2011, SANS Insti-
tute security experts reported a major SQL injection attack 
(SQLIA) that affected approximately 160,000 websites using 
Microsoft’s Internet Information Services (IIS), ASP.NET, and 
SQL Server frameworks (isc.sans.org/diary/SQL+Injection+
Attack+happening+ATM/12127). 
Inadequate validation and sanitization of user inputs 
make websites vulnerable to SQL injection, and research-
ers have proposed various ways to address this problem, 
ranging from simple static analysis to complex dynamic 
analysis. In 2006, William Halfond, Jeremy Viegas, and 
Alessandro Orso2 evaluated then-available techniques and 
called for more precise solutions. In reviewing work during 
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the past decade, we found that developers can effectively 
combat SQL injection using the right combination of state-
of-the art methods. However, they must develop a better 
understanding of SQL injection and how to practically inte-
grate current defenses. 
INSECURE CODING PRACTICES 
SQL is the standard language for accessing database 
servers, including MySQL, Oracle, and SQL Server.1 Web 
programming languages such as Java, ASP.NET, and PHP 
provide various methods for constructing and executing 
SQL statements, but, due to a lack of training and develop-
ment experience, application developers often misuse these 
methods, resulting in SQL injection vulnerabilities (SQLIVs). 
Developers commonly rely on dynamic query building 
with string concatenation to construct SQL statements. 
During runtime, the system forms queries with inputs 
directly received from external sources. This method 
makes it possible to build different queries based on vary-
ing conditions set by users. However, as this is the cause of 
many SQLIVs, some developers opt to use parameterized 
queries or stored procedures. While these methods are 
more secure, their inappropriate use can still result in vul-
nerable code. In the PHP code examples below, name and 
pwd are the “varchar” type columns and id is the “integer” 
type column of a user database table.
Absence of checks. The most common and serious mis-
take developers make is using inputs in SQL statements 
without any checks. The following PHP code is an example 
of such a dynamic SQL statement:
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$query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE name =  
  ‘$_GET[“name”]’ AND pwd = ‘$_GET[“pwd”]’”;
Attackers can use tautologies to exploit this insecure 
practice. In this case, by supplying the value x’ OR ‘1’=‘1 
to the input parameter name, an attacker could access user 
information without a valid account because the WHERE-
clause condition becomes
WHERE name = ‘x’ OR ‘1’=‘1’ AND …”;
which the system will evaluate to be true.
Insufficient escaping. If a developer escapes special 
characters meaningful to a SQL parser, the parser will not 
interpret them as SQL commands. For example, the above 
tautology-based attack could be prevented by escaping 
the ’ character (to avoid its being interpreted as a string 
delimiter) from the inputs. However, many developers are 
either not aware of the full list of characters that have spe-
cial meanings to the SQL parser or they are not familiar 
with the proper usage patterns. 
Consider the following PHP code, mysql_real_escape_
string, which is a function used to escape MySQL special 
characters: 
$name = mysql_real_escape_string($_GET[“name”]);
$query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE pwd LIKE      
  ‘%$pwd%’”;
The function mysql_real_escape_string would 
protect SQL statements that do not use pattern-matching 
database operators such as LIKE, GRANT, and REVOKE. In 
this case, however, an attacker could include the additional 
wildcard characters % and _ in the password field to match 
more password characters than the beginning and end 
characters because mysql_real_escape_string does not 
escape wildcard characters. 
Absence of data type checks. Another error that develop-
ers make is failing to check data types before constructing 
SQL statements. Instead, they often apply programming 
language or database-provided sanitization functions such 
as addslashes and mysql_real_escape_string to the 
input parameters before using them in SQL statements. 
However, when the query is to access the database 
columns of numeric data and other non-text-based data 
types, a SQLIA need not contain the escaped/sanitized 
characters. For example, the following PHP code shows a 
SQL statement for which a tautology-based attack could be 
conducted by supplying the value 1 OR 1=1 to the param-
eter id:
$id = mysql_real_escape_string($_GET[“id”]);
$query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE id = 
  $id”;
For such queries, instead of escaping characters, devel-
opers should use a data type check—for example, 
if(is_numeric($id))—to prevent SQLIAs. 
Absence or misuse of delimiters in query strings. When 
constructing a query string with inputs, a programmer 
must use proper delimiters to indicate the input’s data 
type. The absence or misuse of delimiters could enable SQL 
injection even in the presence of thorough input validation, 
escaping, and type checking. For example, the following 
PHP code does not include delimiters to indicate the input 
string used in the SQL statement: 
$name = mysql_real_escape_string($_GET[“name”]);
$query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE name =  
  $name”;
In this case, when the database server has the automatic 
type conversion function enabled, an attacker could use 
an alternate encoding method that circumvents input sani-
tization routines. For instance, if the attacker supplies the 
encoded HEX string 0x270x780x270x200x4f0x520x200x
310x3d0x31 to the parameter name, the database parser 
may convert it to the “varchar” value, resulting in the tau-
tology string ‘x’ OR 1=1. Because the conversion occurs 
in the database, the server program’s escaping function 
would not detect any special characters encoded in the 
HEX string.
Improper parameterized queries or stored procedures. 
Most developers believe that SQL injection is impossible 
when using parameterized queries or stored procedures to 
run SQL statements. Although this is generally true, some 
developers are not aware that SQL injection is still possible 
if parameterized query strings or stored procedures accept 
nonparameterized inputs. 
Consider, for example, the following PHP code:
$query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE name =  
  ?”.“ORDER BY ‘$_GET[“order”]’”;
$stmt = $dbo->prepare($query);
$stmt->bindParam(1, $_GET[“name”]);
$stmt->execute();
Although an attacker could not conduct a SQLIA through 
the parameter name, SQL injection is still possible through 
order, which is not parameterized. An attacker could inject 
piggy-backed query attacks—malicious queries attached to 
the original query—such as ASC; DROP TABLE user; -- into 
the parameter order.
SQL INJECTION DEFENSES
SQL injection defense methods can be broadly classified 
into three types: defensive coding, SQLIV detection, and 
SQLIA runtime prevention. Table 1 compares the strengths 
and weaknesses of various approaches in each category. 
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Table 1. Comparison of SQL injection defenses.
Defense 
type Defense
User 
involvement
Vulnerability 
locating
Verification 
assistance
Code 
modifi-
cation
Generate 
test suite
Usage 
stage
Infra- 
structure
Defensive 
coding
Manual 
defensive 
coding 
practices
Very high No No Manual No Develop-
ment
Developer 
training
SQL DOM High No No Manual No Develop-
ment
Developer 
training
Parameter-
ized query 
insertion
Medium No No Auto-
mated
No Testing 
and 
debugging
Tool  
for code 
replacement
SQLIV 
detection
SQL- 
UnitGen
Medium Automated Unit test reports No Yes Testing 
and 
debugging
Static  
analysis  
tool
MUSIC Very high Manual 
inspection
Test inputs that 
expose the 
weaknesses of 
implemented 
defense 
mechanisms
Manual Yes Testing 
and 
debugging
Manual  
tests
Vulnerabil-
ity and 
attack 
injection
Low Manual 
inspection
Test inputs that 
expose the 
weaknesses of 
implemented 
defense 
mechanisms
Auto-
mated
Yes Testing 
and 
debugging
Injection tool
SUSHI Low Automated Path conditions 
that lead to 
SQLIVs
Auto-
mated
Yes Testing 
and 
debugging
Symbolic 
execution 
engine
Ardilla Low Automated Concrete attacks Auto-
mated
Yes Testing 
and 
debugging
Concolic exe-
cution 
engine
String 
analyzer 
Medium Automated Static dataflow 
traces
No No Code 
verification
Static string 
analysis 
 tool
PhpMinerI Low Automated Statistics of sani-
tization methods 
implemented
No No Code 
verification
Static  
analysis  
and data 
mining tool
Runtime 
SQLIA 
preven-
tion
SQLrand High No No Manual No Deploy-
ment
Runtime 
checker
AMNESIA Low No Static dataflow 
traces
Auto-
mated
No Deploy-
ment
Static analy-
sis tool  
and runtime 
checker
SQLCheck Low No No No No Deploy-
ment
Runtime 
checker
WASP Low No No Auto-
mated
No Deploy-
ment
Instrumenta-
tion tool and 
runtime 
checker
SQLProb High No No No No Deploy-
ment
Runtime 
checker
CANDID Low No No Auto-
mated
No Deploy-
ment
Instrumenta-
tion tool  
and runtime 
checker
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Developers could overcome the shortcomings of individual 
methods by combining schemes, as Figure 1 shows. 
Defensive coding
Defensive coding is a straightforward solution, as SQLIVs 
are the direct consequence of developers’ insecure coding 
practices. 
Manual defensive coding practices. Many secu-
rity reports, such as OWASP’s SQL Injection Prevention 
Cheat Sheet (http://owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_ 
Prevention_Cheat_Sheet) and Chris Anley’s white paper,1 
provide useful manual defensive coding guidelines.
Parameterized queries or stored procedures. Replacing 
dynamic queries with properly coded parameterized que-
ries or stored procedures would force developers to first 
define the SQL code’s structure before including param-
eters to the query. Because parameters are bound to the 
defined SQL structure, it is not possible to inject additional 
SQL code.
Escaping. If dynamic queries cannot be avoided, escaping 
all user-supplied parameters is the best option. However, as 
insufficient or improper escaping practices are common, 
developers should identify all input sources to realize the 
parameters that need escaping, follow database-specific 
escaping procedures, and use standard escaping libraries 
instead of custom escaping methods.
Data type validation. In addition to escaping, develop-
ers should use data type validation. Validating whether 
an input is string or numeric could easily reject type-
mismatched inputs. This could also simplify the escaping 
process because validated numeric inputs need no further 
cleansing action and could be 
safely used in queries.
White list filtering. Develop-
ers often use black list filtering to 
reject known bad special char-
acters such as ’ and ; from the 
parameters to avoid SQL injec-
tion. However, accepting only 
inputs known to be legitimate is 
safer. This filtering approach is 
suitable for well-structured data 
such as email addresses, dates, 
zip codes, and Social Security 
numbers. Developers could keep a 
list of legitimate data patterns and 
accept only matching input data.
SQL DOM. Although manual 
defensive coding practices are 
the best way to defeat SQL in- 
jection, their application is labor- 
intensive and error-prone. To 
alleviate these problems, Russell 
McClure and Ingolf Krüger3 created 
SQL DOM, a set of classes that enables automated data 
type validation and escaping. Developers provide their own 
database schema and construct SQL statements using its 
APIs. SQL DOM is especially useful when developers need 
to use dynamic queries instead of parameterized queries 
for greater flexibility. However, they can only use it with 
new software projects, and they must learn a new query-
development process.
Parameterized query insertion. An automated vul-
nerability removal approach finds potentially vulnerable 
(dynamic) SQL statements in programs and replaces them 
with parameterized SQL statements.4 For example, this 
approach would replace the PHP code
$rs = mysql_query(“SELECT info FROM user WHERE  
  id = ‘$id’);
   
with the following code:
   
$dbh=new PDO(“mysql:host=xxx;dbname=xxx;”,“root”, 
  “pwd”);
$PSinput00[] = Array();
$PSquery00 = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE id =  
  ?”;
$PSInput00[] = $id;
$stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$i = 1;
foreach($PSinput00 as $input){
   $stmt->bindParam($i++, $input); 
}
$rs = $stmt->execute();
Figure 1. Web application developers could overcome the shortcomings of individual SQL 
injection methods by combining various schemes.
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   A shortcoming of this method is that it only works on 
SQL structures built with explicit strings; developers must 
incorporate program analysis techniques to deduce SQL 
structures built with data objects or through function calls.
SQLIV detection
Researchers have developed several methods to detect 
SQLIVs.
Code-based vulnerability testing. This approach gener-
ally aims to generate an adequate test suite for detecting 
SQLIVs. However, it does not explicitly find vulnerable pro-
gram points, necessitating manual inspection. 
SQLUnitGen5 is a prototype tool that uses static analysis 
to track user inputs to database access points and generate 
unit test reports containing SQLIA patterns for these points.
MUSIC (mutation-based SQL injection vulnerability 
checking)6 uses nine mutation operators to replace origi-
nal queries in a Web program with mutated queries. José 
Fonseca, Marco Vieira, and Henrique Madeira7 developed 
a tool that automatically injects SQLIVs into Web programs 
and generates SQLIAs. Both tools assess the effectiveness of 
the security mechanisms implemented in the application 
under test based on the injected mutants/vulnerabilities 
detected. 
Concrete attack generation. This type of approach uses 
state-of-the-art symbolic execution techniques to automati-
cally generate test inputs that actually expose SQLIVs in a 
Web program. 
Symbolic execution generates test inputs by solving the 
constraints imposed on the inputs along the path to be exer-
cised. Traditionally, symbolic-execution-based approaches 
use constraint solvers that only handle numeric operations. 
Because inputs to Web applications are by default strings, 
if a constraint solver can solve myriad string operations 
applied to inputs, developers could use symbolic execution 
to both detect the vulnerability of SQL statements that use 
inputs and generate concrete inputs that attack them. 
Xiang Fu and Chung-Chih Li developed a vulnerability 
detection tool consisting of JavaSye, a symbolic execution 
engine, and SUSHI, a powerful hybrid (numeric and string) 
constraint solver.8 SUSHI solves path conditions that lead to 
SQL statements and extracts test inputs containing SQLIAs 
from the solution pool. As the “SUSHI Constraint Solver” 
sidebar describes, if the tool generates such a test input, 
the corresponding SQL statement is vulnerable.
Although effective, symbolic execution alone is gener-
ally not scalable to large programs due to path explosion. 
Researchers have thus proposed various solutions to 
improve code coverage. Ardilla9 incorporates concrete exe-
cution into symbolic execution, using randomized concrete 
test inputs to exercise program paths that constraint solv-
ers cannot symbolically solve. SWAT10 uses a search-based 
algorithm that formulates test input adequacy criteria as 
fitness functions. It uses these functions to compare pooled 
SUSHI Constraint 
Solver
c onsider the following snippet of vulnerable PHP code:
1 $id = addslashes($_COOKIE[“id”]);
2 $query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE ”; 
3 if($id!=null) {
4    $query .= “id = $id”;   //path 1
  } else { 
5    $name = addslashes($_GET[“name”]);
6    $order = addslashes($_GET[“order”]);
7    $query .= “name = ‘$name’ ORDER BY 
     ‘$order’”;     //path 2
  }
8 $rs = mysql_query($query);
The function addslashes() escapes string delimiters. 
Therefore, a SQL injection attack is not possible through path 
2 because a single-quote string delimiter is required to cancel 
out the delimiters ($name) used in the query; however, a SQLIA 
is possible through path 1 because the cookie parameter id is 
an integer type and thus a string delimiter is not required to 
create an attack.
X
c→\c
 is the symbolic expression of the addslashes() 
function— which escapes the four SQL special characters  ’, ”, 
\, and \0—performed on id. When the symbolic execution 
engine reaches the query execution statement at line 8, SUSHI 
constructs and solves the following constraint, a conjunction 
of two string equations in which + represents string concate-
nation and ≡ separates the left- and right-hand sides of the 
equations:
!(X
c→\c
 ≡ null) ^ (“id = ” + X
c→\c
 ≡ id = [0-9]* 
OR 1=1 --)
The second equation asks: Is it possible to obtain a solu-
tion for X such that the string on the left-hand side is matched 
by the regular expression on the right-hand side? If yes, the 
query structure constructed with the string on the left-hand 
side is vulnerable because the regular expression on the 
right-hand side is a representation of a tautology attack 
(SUSHI maintains a set of regular expressions that represent 
different types of attack patterns). In this case, SUSHI clearly 
has a solution for this constraint, thereby detecting an SQL 
injection vulnerability:  
1 → $id: X
c→\c
     Path Condition: true
2 → $id: X
c→\c
   
     $query: “SELECT …”
     Path Condition: true
3 → $id: X
c→\c
   
     $query: “SELECT …”
     Path Condition: X
c→\c
=null
4 → $id: X
c→\c
   
     $query: “SELECT …”.“id = X
c→\c
”
     Path Condition: X
c→\c
!=null
8 → Database access point found, 
     constraint solver is invoked!
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  $query .= “name = ‘$name’ ORDER BY 
  ‘$order’”;     //path 2
}
$rs = mysql_query($query);
Running PhpMinerI on this code would produce the follow-
ing vulnerability predictor in the form of a classification 
tree:
  
sql_sanit < 0 : Vulnerable
sql_sanit  ≥ 0
|      dbattr_num < 0 : Not-Vulnerable
|      dbattr_num  ≥ 0
|      | num_check < 0 : Vulnerable
|      | num_check  ≥ 0 : Not-Vulnerable
     
The tree indicates that a database access point is vulnerable 
if no database-specific sanitization routine is implemented 
or if there is an access to a database table’s numeric column 
without any numeric type check in the program.
Such a probabilistic-based approach does not provide 
precise analysis of vulnerabilities, but it is still useful given 
that collecting static code attributes is easy and powerful 
data mining tools such as Weka (cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka) 
are readily available. Developers could save much effort by 
focusing on those code sections predicted to be vulnerable, 
while incorporating techniques that mine control-flow and 
data-dependency graphs would better discriminate vulner-
ability signatures and improve precision in vulnerability 
localization.  
Runtime SQLIA prevention 
Researchers have developed tools and techniques that 
could prevent all SQLIAs by checking actual runtime 
against legitimate queries. However, runtime checks incur 
a performance penalty, and some of these approaches 
require code instrumentation to enable runtime checking, 
which might make debugging security vulnerabilities even 
more complex.
Randomization. SQLrand is a proposed mechanism that 
forces developers to construct queries using randomized 
SQL keywords instead of normal keywords.16 A proxy filter 
intercepts queries sent to the database and de-randomizes 
the keywords. An attacker could not inject SQL code with-
out the secret key to randomization. 
Learning-based prevention. This type of approach 
uses a runtime monitoring system deployed between 
the application server and database server. It intercepts 
all queries and checks SQL keywords to determine 
whether the queries’ syntactic structures are legitimate 
(programmer-intended) before the application sends them 
to the database. 
User specification. Specification-based methods require 
developers to specify legitimate query structures using 
test inputs and then applies the best (fittest) test inputs to 
further explore program paths. 
To the best of our knowledge, researchers have not 
developed search-based or AI algorithms to detect SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. However, it is possible to incorpo-
rate these recent techniques into symbolic-execution-based 
SQLIV detection—for example, eliminating false negatives 
resulting from code uncovered by symbolic execution. 
Taint-based vulnerability detection. Researchers have 
formulated SQL injection as an information flow integrity 
problem.11 As such, it can be avoided by using static and 
dynamic techniques to prevent tainted data (user inputs) 
from affecting untainted data, such as programmer-defined 
SQL query structures. 
Several researchers have applied prominent static 
analysis techniques, such as flow-sensitive analysis, context- 
sensitive analysis, alias analysis, and interprocedural 
dependency analysis, to identify input sources and data 
sinks (database access points) and check whether every 
flow from a source to a sink is subject to an input valida-
tion and/or input sanitization routine.12,13 However, these 
approaches suffer from one or more of the following limi-
tations: they do not precisely model the semantics of such 
routines, do not consider input validation using predi-
cates, fail to specify vulnerability patterns, or require user 
intervention to state the taintedness of external or library 
functions that inputs pass through. All these limitations 
could result in false negatives or positives. 
Gary Wassermann and Zhendong Su14 used context-
free grammars to model the effects of input validation and 
sanitization routines. Their technique checks whether SQL 
queries syntactically confine the string values returned 
from those routines and, if so, automatically concludes 
that the routines used are correctly implemented (and vice 
versa). Wassermann and Su’s approach would not miss any 
vulnerability, but it does not precisely handle some of the 
complex string operations, and its conservative assump-
tions might result in false positives.  
Data-mining-based vulnerability prediction. Php-
MinerI15 mines static code attributes that represent the 
characteristics of input sanitization routines implemented 
in Web programs. It then feeds the mined attributes and the 
associated vulnerability information of existing programs 
to lightweight classifications for building vulnerability 
predictors. 
Consider, for example, the following PHP code snippet:
$id = addslashes($_COOKIE[“id”]);
$query = “SELECT info FROM user WHERE ”; 
if($id!=null) {
  $query .= “id = $id”;    //path 1
} else { 
  $name = addslashes($_GET[“name”]);
  $order = addslashes($_GET[“order”]);
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source code, the attempted SQLIA does not generate a query 
structure different from that generated by its corresponding 
candidate input, id←null; name=“x”; order←“x”. There-
fore, CANDID does not consider it as an attack.
TOOL SUPPORT
To aid developers and security testers, some researchers 
have made their work or implementations available online. 
In addition to the SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet, 
OWASP provides the Enterprise Security API (ESAPI), a 
library of various security APIs for retrofitting SQL injec-
tion defense mechanisms into existing Web applications 
(http://owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Enterprise_ 
Security_API), to assist in defensive coding.  
For SQLIV detection, a symbolic-execution-based tool is 
available for download (http://people.hofstra.edu/Xiang_Fu/
XiangFu/projects.php). As SUSHI is an independent solver, 
developers can use it for different programming languages 
including Java and PHP. To improve SQLIV coverage, devel-
opers can also use other symbolic execution engines in 
place of JavaSye, such as JavaPathFinder (http://babelfish.
arc.nasa.gov/trac/jpf). The static string analysis tools for 
PHP (http://score.is.tsukuba.ac.jp/~minamide/phpsa) and 
PhpMinerI (http://sharlwinkhin.com/phpminer.html) are 
also available online. 
Downloadable runtime SQLIA prevention implementa-
tions include the static-analysis-based AMNESIA (http://
www-bcf.usc.edu/~halfond/amnesia.html), which works 
on Java. The dynamic-analysis-based WASP is being 
commercialized. 
Numerous off-the-shelf offerings are useful for quickly 
detecting the presence of SQLIVs in websites. SecuBat 
(secubat.codeplex.com), an open source black-box vulnera-
bility scanner, uses a Web spider to identify test targets—for 
example, webpages that accept user inputs. It then launches 
predefined attacks against these targets and determines 
whether an attack was successful by evaluating the server 
response against attack-specific response criteria, such as 
SQL exceptions raised and program crashes. Other open 
source scanners, such as Nikto2 (http://cirt.net/nikto2) and 
sqlmap (http://sqlmap.org), are similar to SecuBat, but they 
generally require known vulnerability patterns or user 
intervention to conclude successful attacks. 
Marco Vieira, Nuno Antunes, and Henrique Madeira25 
tested and reported on the performance of three popu-
formal language expressions such as Extended Backus-
Naur Form.17,18
Static analysis. AMNESIA (Analysis for Monitoring and 
NEutralizing SQL Injection Attacks)19 uses static analysis to 
deduce valid queries that might appear at each database 
access point in Web programs via isolation of tainted and 
untainted data. Another runtime SQLIA prevention tech-
nique uses a query learning approach similar to AMNESIA, 
but, instead of targeting query statements in a server pro-
gram, it targets stored procedures in a database.20
Dynamic analysis. Statically inferred legitimate query 
structures might not be accurate, and attackers could 
exploit this weakness to conduct SQLIAs.21 Researchers 
have thus proposed dynamic-analysis-based approaches 
to provide more accuracy. 
SQLCheck22 tracks tainted data at runtime by marking 
it with metacharacters. When a Web application invokes 
a query, SQLCheck learns the query’s legitimate structure 
by excluding marked data from it. Conversely, WASP (Web 
application SQL-injection preventer)23 tracks untainted data 
because identifying all input sources is often difficult, thus 
some tainted data might go undetected. Metacharacter 
marking requires low user effort, but it changes the data’s 
original structure and thus might cause unpredictable 
errors on benign inputs.  
SQLProb24 executes a program of interest with various 
valid inputs to collect all possible queries that might legiti-
mately appear during runtime. During runtime, it uses a 
global pairwise alignment algorithm to compare issued 
user queries against those in the legitimate query reposi-
tory and extracts the user inputs. It then uses a SQL parser 
to check whether each extracted input is indeed part of 
the issued query’s syntactic structure. SQLProb sends the 
query to the database only if the user input is syntactically 
confined. This approach requires using test inputs and 
assumes that the test inputs are sufficient to exercise all 
possible queries in the program. 
CANDID21 dynamically mines a program’s legitimate 
query structure at each path by executing the program with 
valid and nonattacking inputs and, thereafter, comparing 
the actual issued query with the legitimate query structure 
mined for the same path. 
To illustrate, consider again the PHP code snippet. If the 
runtime user input is id←“1 OR 1=1 --”, the input exercises 
path 1 and generates a query whose structure is SELECT 
? FROM ? WHERE ?=? OR ?=? –- while its correspond-
ing candidate input (a valid input that exercises the same 
path as the runtime input), id←“1”, generates a different 
query structure: SELECT ? FROM ? WHERE ?=?. CANDID 
detects a SQLIA and prevents execution of the query. If the 
runtime user input is id←null; name=“x’ OR ‘1’=‘1”; 
order←“ASC”, the input exercises path 2 and generates a 
query whose structure is SELECT ? FROM ? WHERE ?=? 
ORDER BY ?. In this case, due to the use of escaping in 
Numerous off-the-shelf 
offerings are useful for quickly 
detecting the presence of 
SQLIVs in websites.
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lar commercial vulnerability scanners: HP WebInspect 
(www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/products/hp-fortify 
-software-security-center/hp-webinspect), IBM Rational 
(now Security) AppScan (http://www-01.ibm.com/software/
awdtools/appscan), and the Acunetix Web Vulnerability 
Scanner (www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner).
E ach of the three main avenues to defeat SQL injection has its own strengths and weaknesses. Defensive coding practices will ensure secure code but are time-consuming and labor-intensive. Vulnerability 
detection approaches can identify most if not all SQLIVs, 
but they will also generate many false alarms. Runtime 
prevention methods can prevent SQLIAs, but they require 
dynamic monitoring systems. The most effective strategy 
calls for combining all three approaches. However, this 
presents two major challenges. 
First, Web application developers need more extensive 
training to raise their awareness about SQL injection and to 
become familiar with state-of-the-art defenses. At the same 
time, they need sufficient time and resources to implement 
security measures. Too often, project managers pay less 
attention to security than to functional requirements.
Second, researchers should implement their proposed 
approaches and make such implementations, along with 
comprehensive user manuals, available either commer-
cially or as open source. Too many existing techniques are 
either not publicly available or are difficult to adopt. Readily 
available tools would motivate more developers to combat 
SQL injection. In addition, researchers should find simple 
ways to effectively combine existing defensive schemes to 
overcome the limitations of individual methods rather than 
focusing exclusively on novel ones. 
Traditionally, SQL injection was limited to personal 
computing environments. However, the increasing use 
of smartphones, tablets, and other portable devices has 
extended this problem to mobile and cloud computing envi-
ronments, where vulnerabilities could spread much faster 
and become much easier to exploit. Security researchers 
therefore need to address additional SQLIV-related issues 
arising from the greater flexibility and mobility of emerg-
ing computing platforms as well as newer programming 
languages such as HTML5. 
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